

overall assessment of Iraq as a threat was mistaken. U.N. Resolution 1441 gave Saddam ample opportunity to come clean about his weapons, but he refused. The reports from David Kay and his WMD task force have since shown that Saddam violated 1441 in multiple ways.

Saddam retained a "just-in-time" capability to make WMD, even if he destroyed, hid or removed the "stockpiles" that the CIA believed he had. It's fanciful to think, especially in light of the Oil for Food scandal, that U.N.-led containment was a realistic option for another 12 years, or that once containment ended Saddam wouldn't have expanded his weapons capacity very quickly. The Senate report makes clear we need a better CIA, not that we should have left in power a homicidal, WMD-using dictator.

Mr. BOND. I yield the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. ENZI). Who yields time? The time is under the control of the majority.

Mr. REID. Mr. President, on behalf of the minority, are we now on the constitutional amendment?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. No, we have 4 minutes 45 seconds left on the Republican side.

The Senator from Montana.

CONGRATULATIONS

Mr. BURNS. Mr. President, I wish to make a short statement of congratulations to my good friend from Missouri, Senator BOND, and also congratulate his son on graduating OCS at Quantico, now a fresh new lieutenant in the U.S. Marine Corps looking for assignment. He is talking recon. I know that is a tough road. So congratulations on your son. We wish him well in his tour in the U.S. Marine Corps.

Mr. BOND. I thank the Senator.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Mississippi.

Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, how much time do we have remaining?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. There is 4 minutes.

CRITICAL ISSUES

Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I urge my colleagues and our leadership on both sides of the aisle to find a way for us to work together to address some of the critical issues facing this country. We have in conference now on a highway bill, a transportation bill that is important for economic development, for the creation of jobs, and for safety. I hope the conference will not become so obsessed with achieving the highest possible funding level that we wind up not getting a bill. It takes leadership and courage. It also takes being willing to accept what you can get, and get a conclusion that is good for everybody and move forward.

We need an energy bill. The very idea that we still do not have a national energy policy is indefensible. Yet we continue to labor over how do we get an energy bill, what is in the package, and how are we going to get back to the floor of the Senate. We need to find a way to do that.

The very idea that there is an effort to block the FSC/ETI JOBS growth bill, which involves a ruling by the WTO which has led to American products being hit with a penalty in Europe, and that we are not going to go to conference until we get some guarantee of what the result will be or that one Senator will be able to decide the conference report, what have we come to? We should get this bill in conference and get a result. Does it need to be changed? Yes. Has it become bloated? Absolutely. But if we don't deal with this, American products are going to wind up facing a penalty of 12 percent or more before we get a chance to address it again. It could go up to 17 percent. We are not going to deal with the job growth provisions in this legislation. We need to find a way to get it done.

I hope our leaders will find a way to get these conferences going or get us into conference and get a result, because we need to get this done for the American people. I know it is a political season—Presidential campaigns, Senate races, and congressional. I still maintain, as I always have, that the best politics is results. Get things done for the people. There is plenty of credit to go around.

If we stand here and find a way to question each other's motives and block and obstruct and confuse, we are going to pay a price as an institution. I worry about that.

REPORT OF SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, on the Select Committee on Intelligence report, I emphasize again, this was a unanimous bipartisan vote. There are problems with the intelligence community. We did not get what we needed before we went to war in Iraq. It was flawed and misleading and inaccurate. We should acknowledge that. But all the effort that is going on now to find a way to fix political blame is a mistake. We should be working together to produce results. That is why I am working with Senator FEINSTEIN of California on some proposals. That is why I am working with Senator WYDEN on some proposals.

We have 1 minute remaining?

Mr. REID. Mr. President, I am happy to not object, but Senator LAUTENBERG was on the floor this morning and asked for an additional 5 minutes, and it was objected to.

Mr. LOTT. I think I have 1 minute left.

Mr. REID. I was just waiting for an opportunity to say what I just said.

Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, we need to find a way to deal with the problem.

The point I want to make is, Congress is now like somebody that has been at the scene of an accident. We saw it happen, but now we are pretending we weren't there. Congress is a part of this problem. For 20 years we have underfunded, we have limited

human intelligence. We have improperly funded the intelligence community. We have allowed a situation where 80 percent of the money for the intelligence community is under the Department of Defense, not the CIA.

Let me give some numbers. During the 1990s, the number of CIA stations declined by 30 percent. The number of agents declined by 40 percent. The volume of intelligence reports decreased by 50 percent.

The intelligence community connected the dots, and got it wrong. It was not just our intelligence community that got it wrong—there was a global breakdown in intelligence analysis. The report is not an indictment of the hard-working and dedicated men and women who put their lives on the line, and are charged with connecting the dots. It is a criticism of the process and community at large, and demonstrative of a lack of leadership, oversight, and insufficient investment.

The breakdown in intelligence capability evolved over several years. It was recognized in 1976 by a 5-volume report by the Church committee. Our intelligence gathering and analysis capability—especially human intelligence and linguists—was gutted in the 20 years that followed, particularly in the 1990s, when the Congress did not adequately fund the intelligence community.

President Clinton relied on this same analysis of the Iraqi threat when he signed the Iraqi Liberation Act. The Congress relied on this same intelligence when we passed several resolutions regarding Iraq; President Bush relied on this intelligence when making his decisions as well. Many have asked whether I want to change my vote given today's assessment of pre-war intelligence—I do not.

Saddam Hussein was a mass murderer who used weapons of mass destruction on his own people; supported terrorism and trained terrorists; provided "bonuses" to the families of terrorists; a destabilizing factor in the Mideast.

Let's not play armchair quarterback by asking "what would have happened if." The country would be much better served if the Congress and the President took action as soon as possible to fix the organization, leadership, and oversight problems that we have with our intelligence community.

When the American people read the Intelligence Committee's report, they will see some fundamental things that need to be changed in the intelligence community. First and foremost it is evident that the Director of Central Intelligence does not really control all aspects of the intelligence community. In fact, as I have said, 80 percent of intelligence dollars go to the Department of Defense, not the CIA. Moreover, many of people that lead the 15 agencies that comprise the intelligence community work for the Department of Defense, not the Director of Central Intelligence.